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What we know: There is evidence to suggest that the implementation of BAC limits can reduce drink-driving and related traffic crashes, causalities and fatalities (Burton et al., 2017). One review found evidence that indicated BAC limits were ineffective unless combined with other interventions (Siegfried and Parry, 2019).
What we know: Licensing of alcohol sales outlets offers local authorities one way to restrict outlet density and days/hours of sale, which are known to be effect levels of consumption (i.e., higher outlet density and greater days/hours of sale are associated with increased alcohol consumption) (Burton et al., 2017; Siegfried and Parry, 2019). Challenges persist around interpretation and enforcement of licensing regulations and questions of prioritisations (e.g., valuing economic priorities over public health concerns) (Jankhotkaew et al., 2022; Burton et al., 2017).
Examples of implementation: The Licensing Act 2003 in England required that all licensing decisions needed to examine evidence about specific outlets and consider licensing objectives, of which public health is not one (Burton et al., 2017). There is some data to suggest that the Licensing Act with its staggering of opening hours shifted violence later into the night rather than affecting total violence (Burton et al., 2017). While there are limited evaluations of the effects of licensing in England, local areas with more effective and stringent licensing approaches have seen some small additional reductions in alcohol-related hospital admissions (Burton et al., 2017).
Types of identified levies: levies against manufacturers or retailers of alcohol products as a percentage of revenue or profit in addition to excise duty and VAT (e.g., 15% tax on industry spend on advertising and sponsorship; 13% tax on large retailers selling alcohol and tobacco products).
What we know: Real-world evidence of efficacy was noted as limited, but cited modelling results indicate potential for disincentivising industry marketing spend and raising state revenue that could be hypothecated for health purposes (Hatchard et al., 2023).
Types of identified incentives: Subsidies via the excise duty system to encourage/discourage particular businesses or products (e.g., Small Breweries Relief); and/or tax incentives for the on-trade (e.g., differential beer duty or lower rate of VAT for draft beer).
What we know: There is limited but suggestive evidence that subsidies or tax-incentives of on-trade could have economic benefits for eligible businesses, but there is inconclusive or no reporting of evidence on consumption impacts (Hatchard et al., 2023).
What we know: There is limited but suggestive evidence that restricting price promotions can reduce consumption, especially on off-trade wine and premixed beverages (Burton et al., 2017).
Types of identified interventions: Training of server staff; responsible serving practices; security staff in bars; stricter policing and enforcement approaches; safety-oriented design of the premise (e.g., replacing glassware with safer alternatives; voluntary removal of the sale of high strength alcohol.
What we know: There is limited but suggestive evidence that multicomponent intervention programmes involving responsible beverage server training, house policies and stricter enforcement of licencing laws are effective in reducing alcohol-related assaults, traffic crashes and underage sales (Siegfried and Parry, 2019; Burton et al., 2017). Server training courses alone show some potential to reduce disorder but lack evidence of efficacy for reducing intoxication (Siegfried and Parry, 2019; Burton et al., 2017). Voluntary removal of high strength alcohol could reduce acute alcohol-related harm but this type of approach is easily undermined (Burton et al., 2017).
What we know: There is limited but suggestive evidence that preventive alcohol education programmes for drink-driving offenders can reduce their likelihood of reoffending (Burton et al., 2017). It is difficult to know the independent effects of this type of programme as they are often accompanied by other components (Burton et al., 2017).
What we know: Voluntary and/or industry self-regulation approaches to restricting alcohol advertising and marketing are ineffective (Burton et al., 2017). Self-regulatory marketing codes for the alcohol industry have shown limited effectiveness, with evaluations indicating multiple violations of content guidelines (Burton et al., 2017).
What we know: The banning of sales of alcohol below the cost of taxation had little to no effect on population level alcohol consumption and no improvements of health outcomes (Burton et al., 2017).
Examples of implementation: The UK government implemented this ban for England and Wales in 2014, and modelling estimated that this approach had a negligible effect on consumption (<0.1%) and only affected 1% of units consumed by harmful drinkers (Burton et al., 2017). In comparison, a MUP approach was predicted to have 40-50x greater impact, as it would affect 44% of units consumed by harmful drinkers (Burton et al., 2017).
What we know: Public drinking bans are not effective for reducing alcohol consumption or alcohol-related harm (Burton et al., 2017). While public drinking bans are typically designed to address crime and disorder, there is limited evidence to show that they impact public safety (there are some small increases in public perception of public safety) (Burton et al., 2017). There is also some evidence to suggest that these bans can negatively impact marginalised groups and displace them to potentially less safe places (Burton et al., 2017).